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Appendix A 
Proof of Lemma 2. To save space, we only derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
skilled worker’s problem. (The conditions for the unskilled worker’s problem can be derived 
similarly.) For notational convenience, we simply use w as the wage rate in this proof. The 
derivation of the solutions given in Lemma 2 is straightforward from the first-order conditions. 
 To derive the second-order condition, we rewrite the first-order conditions (14)-(16) as 
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 Differentiating (Ud, Uk, Un) further with respect to (d, k, n) and using these first-order 
conditions, we can obtain the Hessian matrix evaluated at the solutions (d*, k*, n*): 
 








nnkndn
knkkdk
dndkdd
UUU
UUU
UUU
 
We give each element Uij for i, j = d, k, n below 
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 The sufficient condition corresponds to a negative definite Hessian matrix. This requires 
the first-order principal minor of the determinant to be negative, the second-order principal 
minor to be positive and the third one to be negative. We sign these principal minors at the 
solutions for (d, k, n) from the first-order conditions, dropping * from the variables for notational 
convenience. It is obvious that the first principal minor is negative, Udd < 0. 
 The second principal minor is signed below 
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The third principal minor is the determinant of the Hessian matrix itself: 
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    1 (since Ud = Uk = 0 and since Un = 0  c(1+) = w) 
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Clearly, |H| < 0 and hence the sufficiently condition holds if and only if α < 1 in Assumption 3. 
That is, the unique interior solution is optimal when the taste for the education of children via 
ln e  is weaker than that for the number of children via ln n . Q.E.D. 
Appendix B 
Steady states with optimal government education spending. When the government education 
spending is optimally chosen, it is a function of gt  as in Proposition 9. In this case, the 
derivative 1 /
g g
t td d  is still positive:  
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However, the sign of the second derivative 2 21 /
g g
t td d  is ambiguous, unlike the case in Lemma 
1. Thus, it is possible to have more than one steady state, though unlikely.  
  At 0gt  , optimal government education spending must be at its minimum according to 
Proposition 9 (with / 0gt tdg d  shown above): 
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0gt  , 1 0g gt tq    . At 1,gt  optimal government education spending must be at its 
maximum: 
     
1
| (1 ) / {(1 )[ (1 )] } max{ }g
t
t s s tg g w n g              
and gtp must also be at its maximum ( ) max{ ( )}
g g g
t t tp p g p g  . From (8), at 1,gt 
1 1
g g
t tp    . Combining these with 1 / 0g gt t    (hence a continuous transition curve with 
positive slopes), at least one steady state must exist and obey *0 1g gt tq p    . Because the 
second derivative is ambiguous, there can be more than one steady state in the current case with 
optimally chosen government education spending tg , denoted by 
* * *g g
t i tq p      with a 
finite valued integer 1 i I Z   . Also, the transition equation (curve) must start above the 45 
degree line with * *1  for 0
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can only be an odd number of intermediate steady states; namely 1,3,5...i  ; see Figure 2. 
Moreover, at the first and the last steady states, the transition curve crosses the 45 degree lines 
from above with a slope 11 / 0
g g
t t     , implying stability at * * * *1  or I     . Thus, there 
must be an even number of steady states that are stable and an odd number of intermediate 
steady states that are unstable. 
